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POLITICAL SCIENCE

Demand and Supply in White Collar Unionism,
1950 to 1968
JOSEPH

LEE*

ABSTRACT - Data of union representation elections held by the National Labor Relations Board
were used in this study to investigate demand by white collar workers for union services, and
union efforts to organize white collar workers between 1950 and 1969. Findings indicate that slow
growth of white collar unionism prior to the 50's was due to a lack of demand for union services
among white collar workers and a lack of interest among unions to organize white collar workers,
but in the late 60's it was mainly because of the lack of .union efforts to organize the white collar
workers. Possible preference for different types of unions among these workers was also investigated. Unions of the strong bargaining power type are prefered by the white collar workers, even
though that form does not preserve white collar status. Thus the existing union structure does not
appear cis a serious obstacle to unionization of white collar workers. The conclusion must be
considered tentative because unions also recruit members through such methods as elections
conducted by public agencies as well as by direct organizing.

It is the purpose of this paper to inquire, first, whether
white collar workers have lower propensity to join unions
than blue collar workers. If so, what are the causes. Second, to inquire whether the slow growth of white collai
unionism is attributable to the lack of union organizing
effort. Third, which type of union is most "demanded"
by white collar workers.
Demand for union is defined as workers' demand for
union services. Union services include negotiations on
wage rates, fringe benefits, employment security and handling of grievances. In this study the demand is measured
by a.) the percentage of valid votes cast for unions, and
b.) the percentage of election units won by unions in representation elections conducted by the National Labor
Relations Board. (This is called the political process approach and has been employed in several empirical studies which attempted to measure citizen demand for public goods. (Musgrave, 1959; Birdsell, 1963; Tiebout,
1956, Buchanan, 1962.) Supply of union is defined as
efforts to organize the unorganized or the availability of
unions to non-union members. It is measured by a.) the
number of election units, b.) the number of employees,
and c.) the percentage of non-union members in the
non-agricultural sector involved in NLRB elections.
(Spielman, 1956.)
Relative demand for services

Many writers have said demand for union services is
lower among white collar workers than among blue collar workers. In order to test this hypothesis, NLRB election results are compared. As table 1 reveals, between
1957 and 1968 there were three years - 1962, '65, and
'67 - in which the percentage of election units won by
unions was higher among white collar worker than blue
collar workers. In 1957, '59, '60, and '61, the figures
were about 10 percent higher among blue collar workers.
Percentages were very close between the two worker
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groups in the other five years. The number of valid votes
cast for unions was constantly higher among blue collar
workers by about 10 percent. Thus, although the election
data reveal higher demand for union among blue collar
workers, the margin is generally small.
Factors Contributing to Different Demand

ECONOMIC POSITION: In the years studied, white
collar workers usually had higher incomes than blue collar workers. In 1929, white collar workers earned almost
30 percent more than manual workers, but this income
difference is gradually narrowing. In 1952, manual workers had an average wage of $69.24 per week while white
collar workers had an average of $66.63 per week.
(Burns, 1954.) The Bureau of Labor Statistics also reported that between 1939 and 1950 the median salary
for clerical workers increased by 111 percent, the wage
or operative and kindred workers was raised by 172 percent.
A Bureau of Labor Statistics study also shows that
although white collar pay in private industries increased
at a higher rate in recent years, the rapid increase occurred only among the professional and administrative
groups. (Caramela, 1969.) For example, the average
annual rate of increase between 1961 and 1967 was 3.9
percent for professional workers and only 3 percent for
clerical workers. The cumulative increase between June
1961 and June 1968 was 32.9 percent for professional
and 27 percent for clerical workers. (Table 3.)
The wage increase figures show that the economic position of the white collar workers, at least for the nonprofessional white collar workers, is worsening. This
should increase demand for union services by white collar workers.
EDUCATIONAL FACTOR: Since white collar workers' annual salary increments, especially for non-professionals, are lagging, promotion is the only means for improving their economic position. The higher average educational attainment of white collar workers and their
closer relationship with management did provide greater
upward mobility than blue collar workers had.
The Minnesota Academy of Science

In the past, white collar workers usually worked alongside their managers - in the same building, same floor,
and sometimes in the same room, and wore the same
street clothes. Functionally, they used the same tools as
their managers used - pencil, paper, or adding machines.
Selling functions performed at the clerk and vice president levels had certain similarities. Because of such functional closeness, skills learned on the job by white collar
workers were valuable and transferable into promotion,
causing many white collar workers to look at their jobs
as apprenticeship toward management. But with introduction of new technology into office work, the functions
of the white collar workers and management have diversified. The skills acquired at the clerical level can no
longer be transferred to the management level. As one
study of automation effect on office workers concluded:
The division between managerial duties, reserved to
top and middle management, and the tasks performed by the employees is becoming constantly
sharper. Whereas the employee could formerly hope
to rise gradually in the hierarchy through a number of intermediate stages, he now finds himself confined to the role of mere operator, which not only
fails to prepare him for more highly qualified posts,
but makes it more difficult for him to adjust to situations requiring initiative . . . The dividing line
which is already being drawn in the rationalized establishment between machine operators and the rest
of the clerical staff will become the more sharply
defined as the qualifications and duties of certain
technicians enable them to rise above the supervisor, who nevertheless, outranks them in their hierarchy. (Trade Union, 1962; Kassalow, 1966; 359,
Haas, 1960.)
As the upward mobility for these workers is reduced,
the only alternative left for them to improve their economic position is collective action through unionization.
FEMALE SEX RATIO: Many believe that one reason for low demand for unions among white collar workers is the high proportion of females in white collar occupations. It is usually noted that a high proportion of female workers are secondary income earners in their families and a high proportion regard their employment as
temporary. Hence~ they are less concerned about economic position and would be less interested in union.
(Hindle, 1954; Elliott, 1953; Shister, 1953.) H. Douty
once pointed out that:
In 1967 women were 54.3 percent of organizable
white collar employment. In clerical occupations
the proportion was almost three-fourths, and in professional and technical occupations more than one
third. In contrast, women represented only 16.8
percent of blue collar employment, almost wholly
in the category of operatives; even when blue collar
and service workers ( other than household) are
combined, the proportion was only one fourth.
Their significantly higher proportion in white collar
employment probably increases the difficulty of
unionization. (Douty, 1968).
This may have been true in the past, but it has changed
recently. More and more female workers now consider
employment as a career because more female workers
Journal of, Volume Thirty-seven, Nos. 2 and 3, 1971

are in the professional category. An increasing proportion of their income has become a necessity rather than a
luxury. As a result, if one looks at the strikes of public
employees in recent years, it is apparent that the most
militant unions - teacher and hospital employee unions
- consist of more than 63 percent of female workers.
(Ross, 1970).
_
PROXIMITY INFLUENCE: The larger the union
membership, the greater opportunity there is for members to show the non-members what the union can do for
them and thus increase demand for unions.
Only 10.7 percent of the white collar labor force belonged to unions at time of this study, creating a "vicious
circle": the low demand for union services is blamed for
a low degree of unionization, and the low degree of
unionization is blamed for low demand for union by
white collar workers. But, since other factors influence
workers' demand for union and a mass organizing effort
among the unions can probably break the "vicious circle," that should not be a deadlock for the white collar
unionism in the near future.
Organizing efforts among White Collar Workers

Table 4 shows the number of election units and number of white collar workers involved in NLRB representation contests. Two facts stand out:
(1) Unions have spent a very small proportion of their
effort in organizing white collar workers - only 3 percent
in terms of number of election units approached by
unions, and 2 percent in terms of number of employees
approached in the 1950's and early '60's. The figures
have increased to 10 percent and 4 percent respectively
in more recent years. Thus, while the demand for unions
is only about 10 percent less among white collar workers,
the supply of unions is about 90 to 95 percent different
between the two groups of workers.
(2) Regardless of the clamor within the house of labor
over the need and desire to organize white collar workers, the unions have not seriously increased their effort
in this regard.
Factors Contributing to the Low Supply

Most scholars recognize the importance of government
attitudes in determining union growth, as Professor Julius
Rezler of Loyola University points out:
It was the philosophy and practice of the Democratic administration and their receptive attitude
toward unions which primarily account for the spectacular growth of the unions during the two world
wars and the great depression, and not the wars and
depression themselves. (Rezler, 1961.)
Professor Shister, who investigated the effect of the
Taft-Hartley Act on union organizational efforts, power
and collective bargaining tactics, concludes that the impact of the law on union organizational effort is considerably more substantial than its impact on the other two
items. (Shister, 1958.)
The importance of the government attitudes as determinant of the supply of unions can also be seen in President Kennedy's pro-union administration. Executive
Order 10988 of 1962, which gave federal employees the
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right to bargain collectively, greatly encouraged the supply of unions to the public employees. As a result of this
order and similar state statutes, the membership of public
employee unions increased from 1.2 million in 1962 to 1. 7
· million in 1966, a growth of 40 percent within four years.
Also, between 1956 and 1967 the membership in AFLCIO unions increased 7 percent, but membership in the
federal government employee unions increased by 250
percent. (Kassalow, 1969). In the field of banking, only
two percent of the employees in the industry belong to
unions. But the willingness of the Federal Reserve system
to recognize unionism of its employees in the recent years,
greatly stimulated the Office and Professional Employees
International Union's interest to organizing employees of
the banks and a sharp increase of members was expected.
(Correspondence with William Reidy, Research Director
of OPEIU).
A survey of U.S. labor laws shows that white collar
workers in the private sector have been generally excluded from federal legislation. The Wagner Act of 1935
treated blue and white collar workers alike. The TaftHartley Act of 194 7 granted that professional workers
could have separate bargaining, but excluded employees
of non-profit hospitals, foremen, and supervisors from
the coverage, thus retarding the spread of white collar
unionism. European experience demonstrates that foremen's unions have played an important role in the spread
of white collar unionism (Kassalow, 1969). Thus, if the
supply of unions to white collar workers in the private
sector is to be increased substantially, some new policy
and program must be designed by government. (Kassalow, 1968.)
The effect of the number of white collar workers on
the supply of white collar unionism can be divided into
two folds:
(a) As the number of white collar employees in the
labor force increases, the size of the white collar bargaining unit probably increases also and it becomes profitable
for unions to spend effort in organizing them. The cost of
unionizing large or small units is more or less the same,
but the amount of union dues collected is quite different
between large and small units.
(b) As the number of white collar employees in the
labor force increases and the number of blue collar workers decreases, a decrease of total union member potential
and a decrease of union strength and indicated, since 88
percent of the union members in this country are blue
collar workers. Union leaders wanting to maintain their
power have to take a hard look into the white collar sector
and have to spend a greater effort in unionizing this
expanding sector.
Union leadership assessed

The importance of the union leadership to the supply
of unions has been recognized broadly. (Shister, 1953;
Rezler, 1961; Blum, 1968; Davis, 1941.) As Foster once
pointed out, the A.F. of L. leaders actually retarded the
supply of unions in the 20's. He pointed out that between
1917-1919 he initiated several organization campaigns in
the packing and steel industries, and each one was sabo124

taged by the Executive Council of the A.F. of L. (Foster,
193 7). On the contrary, the successful story of the unionization of rubber and steel industries during the same
period were attributed to the leaders in the CIO rather
than to difference in workers demand for unions. The
militant leadership of the CIO, the huge amount of money
raised by Lewis and the people around him, the outside
organizers sent into these industries, all were the factors
attributing to the greater success. (Davis, 1941).
A dynamic, progressive leader, in short, can influence
the supply of unions in the following ways:
He can re-organize the union structure.
He can dream up some new organizing technique.
He knows how and where to collect funds for
unionization campaigns.
He is an entrepreneur, an innovator, manager and
fund raiser. (Schumpeter, 1934.)
A survey of union organizing technique shows no difference between the methods employed in the 1960's and
those employed in the 1950's and 1940's, and there are
no different organizing techniques between white and blue
collar workers.
Basically, the union organizers use letters, meetings,
home visits and phone calls to contact prospective members. Brotslaw's study reveals that of 78 employees approached by the Retail Clerk International Association in
a discount department store in Milwaukee, Wisconsin,
and interviewed by him later, only 16 percent could recall
getting handbills and letters from the union but 90 percent
could recall union meetings and 50 percent could recall
visits to their homes by unionists. Among the 90 percent
who could recall that the union had held meetings, only
35 percent thought the technique was effective; and 27
percent of those who could recall home visits thought that
technique was effective. (Brotslaw, 1967; Brown, 1963;
Blum, 1963.) This points to the conclusion that a large
part of the existing union organization effort had been
wasted.
A new kind of organizing technique had been tried by
the Industrial Unions Department and AFL-CIO in the
early 1960's. It was a joint effort of unions to organize
white collar workers in a given area. For example, the
IUD had coordinated efforts of some unions to launch an
organization campaign in 1963 among white collar workers in five areas: Boston, Chicago, Philadelphia, South
Carolina, and Houston-Dallas-Fort Worth. The AFLCIO had also coordinated with 75 unions in the Los
Angeles area to launch a white collar organization campaign. George Meany, the AFL-CIO president, later reported that the Los Angeles program had brought some
success and he expected "it will point to the way in other
areas."
Since then, however, little has been heard about any
similar programs in other areas. This could be due to the
difficulty in resolving the jurisdiction problem between
unions which have participated.
White Colar Union Growth Structure

Scholars in the field of labor relations generally agree
that the existing union structure is an obstacle to unionThe Minnesota Academy of Science

ization of white collar workers. (Kassalow, 1960; Blum,
1964; Solomon, 1963; Barkin, 1961). But as to how a
new union structure should look, : there js no general
agreement. Some believe tha:t the nature, taste, characteristics, and needs of white collar workers are quite different from those of blue collar workers, so a different union,
a pure white collar union, must be formed. Others believe
that industrial unicws, having strong bargaining power and
financial resources, could solve the structure problem
with a division for white collar workers.
Solomon and Burns of the University of Chicago
(1963), suggest that the existing structure should be
changed to either "a coordinated multi-union" or pure
occupational structural form. They also point out that the
strengths of the coordinated multi-union approach are:
The resources of numerous unions can be brought
together.
Advantage could often accrue from existing collective bargaining relations.
"The impression of strength conveyed to office
workers by the combination of unions would provide
the maximum possible reinforcement of the union
appeal.
Kassalow (1960) o.o. the other hand, suggests the
establishment of a white collar department within the
industrial unions. Solomon Barkin ( 1964). of the University of Massachusetts suggests formation of a white
collar organization committee, like the structure of the
early CIO, and headed by a prominent union leader.
Solomon and Burns' suggestion of coordinated multiunions was tried py IUD and AFL-CIO in the early
1960's Its unpopularity is obviously due to the jurisdiction problem between the participating unions. Kassalow's suggestion has been adapted by the Automobile
Workers. Professor Barkin's ideas "do not appear to have
fallen upon receptive ears." (Blum, 1964).
No study has been done so far to investigate which
type of union is preferred most by white collar workers.
In the following section, we shall first list the characteristics of different types of unions and then investigate
workers' preferences to these unions from the NLRB
election results. The different hypotheses can thus be
tested.
1. Pure blue collar unions with strong bargaining
power-IBT.
These unions are working-class-oriented and are
the mainstream of the labor movement.
·
They are more militant and believe strongly in
using strike power to get what they want.
They have formal union procedure.
The International Brotherhood of Teamsters is representative of this type of union.
2. Semi-pure white collar unions.
This type of union has all the characteristics of
industrial unions, except that there is a separate department for white collar workers. This type of
union is represented by the United Automobile
Journal of, Volume Thirty-seven,Nos. 2 and 3, 1971

Workers (UAW), United Steel Workers (USW)
and International Electrical Workers (IUE).
3. Pure. white collar uni6ns: internationai or national.
About 80 to 100 percent of the members in these
unions are white collar workers.
They are the affiliates of the AFL-'CIO, hence
still belong to the main-stream of the labor movement.
They believe less in using strike as a power to
achieve goals.
These unions preserve at least part of middle
class status and prestige.
They have the formal union procedure, as do the
industrial unions.
This type of union is represented by the Office and
Professional Employees International Union.
4. Local single-firm independent unions.
All or a major part of the members are white
collar workers.
These unions are "person-based."
Office-oriented.
Employer-centered.
Conservative.
Motivated by this own unique idealogy.
No formal union procedure. (Shostak, 1962,
Troy, 1961, 1966, Cohany, 1962.)
In order to test which type of union is preferred most
by the white collar workers, NLRB bi-union and single
union election results are analyzed.
The results of bi-union elections between January
1962 and June 1969 are shown in table 5. The number
of election units in rows 1, 2 and 5 is too small for
meaningful conclusions. But the figures in rows 3 and 4
clearly reveal that the IBT (strong bargaining power) is
preferable to OPEIU (pure white collar). And local
single-firm independent union is preferred over all other
types ( row 4 of table 5) .by white collar workers.
Single union election results are summarized in table
6. These figures reveal that OPEIU has only 0.50 probability of winning an election among clerical workers. The
UAW, USW and IUE have 0.55, 0.53, and 0.58 probability respectively of winning. (Table 6, column 5) IBT
is the most popular union among clerical workers. (0.60
probability of winning an election). There is no significantly different preference among sales workers for the
various types of union. As far as technical workers are
concerned, IBT and IUE are the most popular unions.
The implications of the bi-union and single-union election results are:
White collar workers in general, if they decide to
join a union, prefer to join one which may preserve
existing white collar status, i.e. local, single-firm,
independent union. (Row 3, table 5).
If the local, single-firm union is not available,
they prefer to join a union with strong bargaining
power rather than one which may preserve some
white collar status but is weak in bargaining power.
Those are the reasons why IBT yields the best elec125

tion result among different types of unions, and why
the semi-white collar union yields a better result
than the pure white collar union. (Table 5 and table
6) Since the cost of joining any type of union will
be more or less equal ( union dues tend to be more
or less the same and all three types of unions belong
to the main stream of labor movement), the white
collar workers might as well join a union which has
the strongest muscle.
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